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Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing China
Eva Pils1
Abstract. The Chinese state does not allow rural collectives to sell land, but takes land
from them and makes it available on the urban property market. While rural land rights
are thus easily obliterated, the newly created urban rights in what used to be rural land
enjoy legal protection. The state justifies these land takings by the need for urbanization
and economic growth. The takings have resulted in an impressive contribution of the
construction and property sector to state revenue and GDP growth, but also in unfairness
toward peasants evicted from their land and homes. The example discussed here shows
that certain economic theories of property rights are consistent with discrimination and
should therefore be rejected. A further conclusion is that we must reconsider the claim
that property rights are desirable because they serve economic growth. The discussion
here contributes to an understanding of property in terms of dignity, rather than wealth.
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I. Introduction

“I want our land back.” As one of an estimated 50 to 60 million Chinese rural residents or
“peasants”2 affected by government takings of their land,3 Ms L seemed to know that this
was next to impossible; but she had nevertheless come to Beijing to petition in a case
affecting her and, she said, around 8400 other villagers’ households on the outskirts of
Hangzhou, a prospering coastal city. In retaliation, her husband had been permanently
disabled in a violent attack by unidentified thugs that cowed many of their neighbors into
submissive acceptance of the terms the municipal government “offered” the villagers.
Their teenage daughter, she had just been informed, need not think of trying to enroll for
high school in the City of Hangzhou: she would be sure not to get a place anyway. Ms L
and her immediate family had become outlaws in their hometown – it was longer safe for
her even to go back to the land and house she had so desperately tried to protect, for more
than a brief visit. 4 Her house, from which the authorities had removed the furniture and
fittings, was hung with slogans, including the phrase, “the storm may enter, the rain may
2

The term “peasants” is used advisedly throughout this paper – not although but because the
corresponding Chinese expression nongmin 农民 rather than denoting an occupation as in “farmer,” has a
class meaning. See Hu Meiling (胡美灵, editor), 当代中国农民权利的嬗变(Beijing:2008) at p. 3, arguing
that peasants are a status group (身份群体), not an occupational group (职业群体). See also Eva Pils,
“Citizens? The Legal and Political Status of Peasants and Peasant Migrant Workers in China,” in Liu
Xiangmin (editor), Zhidu, fazhan yu hexie [System, Development, and Harmony] (Ming Pao Press, Hong
Kong: 2007), 173-243.
3
As in the case of Ms Liang, land takings often include the destruction of homes owned by the peasants.
The estimate was provided by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yu Jianrong in 2007 and therefore
does not include later expropriations. The figure must have grown by now. Yu Jianrong (于建嵘, editor)
Subaltern Politics – Dialogues and Lectures (底层政治—对话与演讲), Beijing: 2009), p. 122. Yu
estimates that of these 50-60 million, about half do not find new jobs and lack social security, therefore
becoming destitute (ibid.).
4
Author conversations, Beijing and Hangzhou, December 2008, April, June, July, August 2009 with Ms L
(梁丽婉) from Nongkou village, Jianqiao Town, Jianggan district, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province (浙
江省杭州市江干区笕桥镇弄口村).
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enter [this house] but the Emperor and King cannot enter.”5 She had also written the
titles of China’s Property Rights Law, Land Administration Law, and Constitution on its
outer walls.
Land is widely considered to be the single most important cause of social unrest in
China today,6 and many view the Chinese land tenure and property law as part of the
problem. Since the 1980s, China’s legal and economic reforms have spurred the growth
of the Chinese urban real estate market. Property development has contributed
significantly to China’s economic miracle. But many disputes about the property that is
the basis of this market growth through construction and the real estate market have been
caused by takings of rural or suburban land from peasants, affecting, it has been
calculated, around 770 square kilometers annually (as of 2006). 7 The economic gains
made by some urban governments and individuals in the course of this great
transformation have been considerable,8 as have been the experiences of loss and wrong,
often though not exclusively on the part of the peasants.9

5

In Chinese, 风能进，雨能进，王帝老儿不能进.This phrase is adapted from a famous dictum by
William Pitt the Elder in Parliament (1763).
6
Yu Jianrong’s research suggests that this was so until about 2006, but that the trend may now have
changed to unrest in which the participants have less clear stakes. Yu Jianrong, “Social Conflict in Rural
China,” China Security, Vol. 3 No. 2, Spring 2007, “Emerging Trends in China’s Riots, “ China Security
Vol. 4 No. 3 (2008). Also Zhao Ling and Su Yongtong (赵凌, 苏永通), “First national xinfang report
taken very seriously (国内首份信访报告获高层重视), 6 November 2004 in Southern Weekend (南方周
末), available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zmzg/20041104 1014.asp.
7
Gaoming Jiang, “Toward Sustainable Urbanization in China,” 6 September 2006 at
http://www`.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/348. Erie distinguishes different kinds of construction
project, including industrial parks, residential (urban) construction and infrastructure projects such as dams.
Erie, Mathew, “China's (Post) Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of the Property Law
on Illegal Land Takings,” Hong Kong Law Journal, 2007, Vol. 37, Part 3, pp. 919-949.
8
Zhou Tianyong, an academic at the Chinese Communist Party Central Party School, estimated the total
value of land taken from peasant collectives each year at three trillion Yuan Renminbi (ca. 400 billion
USD).Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) Breaking Through the Obstacles to Development （突破发展的体制性障
碍）Guangzhou, 2005, pp. 2 – 6.
9
Zhou Tianyong estimates that peasants get between 5 and 10% of the value added through the transfer of
land from agricultural to urban construction purposes, and that in the period between the early 1980s and
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This paper argues against legal and political constraints that seem to limit the
recognition of peasant land claims in China, and shows that paradoxically, these
constraints are the result of an enthusiastic embrace of law and property rights as tools to
modernize and develop Chinese society. They are closely connected to certain accounts
of law and property widely used in the international Law and Development field, which
have advocated the formalization and strengthening of (private, individual) property
rights.10 The World Bank and other institutions believe that a system of secure and well
protected private property rights is best justified through its function of promoting growth
in developing societies. Drawing on aspects of a long tradition of liberal economic theory,
De Soto wrote in 1989:

“The importance of property rights is not that they provide assets which benefit
their holders exclusively, but that they give their owners sufficient incentive to add
value to their resources by investing, innovating, or pooling them productively for
the prosperity and progress of the entire community. (…) if a government cannot
give its citizens secure property rights and efficient means of organizing and
transferring them – namely contracts – it is denying them one of the main incentives
for modernizing and developing their operations.” (Emphasis added.)11
The discussion here focuses on the spin that growth and value-increase-oriented
arguments have been given in the context of rural and suburban land grabs in China,
where the need to achieve economic growth has been turned against peasants and their
rights to land and housing. This is how the reasoning goes here: “Peasants can’t sell their
land, because the law says so (and therefore it is doubtful if they really “own” the land
anyway). Since they can’t sell, it is better to take the land away from the peasants, so that

2003, peasant collectives across the country were denied 4,5 trillion Yuan Renminbi, which, he said, ought
to have been their legal compensation. Id.
10
Hernando De Soto, The Other Path. The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York, 1989), esp. pp. 177
et seq. and pp. 244 et seq.
11
De Soto, ibid, p. 178. et seq.
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it can enter an urban property market run by public officials and property developers,
because doing so will maximize the value of the land.” This line of thinking is flawed and
harmful; it is wrong not on empirical but conceptual and rights-based grounds.
In the following two parts II and III of this article, I first discuss how authoritarianism
and an economic growth orientation shape the understanding of property rights in China,
and then go on to analyze certain arguments that seem to weaken peasant land ownership,
which is organized on a collective basis. I criticize these weakening conceptions but
argue that they are in conformity with the Chinese state’s overwhelming interest in
economic growth. This interest is thought to be best served by a discriminatory property
regime whose role in the law on land takings (or “expropriations,” zhengshou) 12 is
discussed in part IV. Yet as argued in part V, utilitarian conceptions of property rights are
blind to violations of dignity such as those experienced by Ms L, and this blindness urges
the conclusion (part VI) that property is better understood in terms of dignity than in
terms of wealth and growth.

II. Authoritarianism and growth: two conceptual constraints on property rights

China has achieved enormous economic growth and poverty reduction, and remained a to
some extent authoritarian country in its thirty-year-long reform period, which began with
the close of the Mao Zedong era. Both facts and the way they are understood in China
have influenced conceptions of property rights there, especially amongst the academic
and bureaucratic establishment:

12

In Chinese, 征收.
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The authoritarian constraint. There is, firstly, a strong sense that property claims must be
derived from authoritative rules created by the power that enforces those claims.
Accounts of this kind may be called authoritarian. They are also positivistic in spirit, in
the sense that they assume that the validity of law is separate from its moral justification.
Importantly in the case of the systems that 20th century legal positivists have drawn on,
such authority itself is bound by other rules of the system; by contrast, this is not quite the
case in China.13 Following the positivistic method, identifying the law e.g. on property
rights becomes a fact-finding mission to answer the question what kind of rules the
authorities have made and promulgated on this subject. Despite legal positivists’
insistence on distinguishing what is legally valid from what is morally right, their basic
premise that these two notions are separate is prone to be hijacked by a simplified,
authoritarian account of law that claims that the law ought to be followed just because it
is the law, derived from unquestionable authority. It is this authoritarian understanding,
rather than merely a positivistic approach to law, that constrains conceptions of property
rights widely used in China.
Leaning on scholarship in the German tradition, 14 Chinese textbooks often
emphatically characterize property rights as “defined by law,” 15 and property law as
possessing an “inherent” nature. This aspect of property rights is not only related to their
13

It would not be fair to modern legal positivism to claim it was identical with prevalent attitudes to law in
China, not least because the model of a municipal legal system contemplated by such scholars as, for
instance, H.L.A. Hart, is widely different from China in that it has functional courts faithfully applying
rules of recognition, rules of adjudication, and other rules. See also Chapter 10 of CoL in which Hart
contemplates the status of imperfect legal systems. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law,Oxford: 1961.
14
Cp. Manfred Wolf, Sachenrecht, 20th edition, Munich: 2004, pp. 13 et seq (“Typenzwang und
Typenfixierung”).
15
This corresponds to the principle of a fixed number or numerus clausus of property rights – also in other
legal orders, it is impossible to create property rights with erga omnes effect simply by contract.. This
principle is under attack from the widespread practice of “minor property rights” discussed below. See e.g.
Cai Yongmin, Tuo Jianfeng, Li Zhihong (蔡永民，脱剑锋， 李志忠), New Property Rights Theory (物权
法新论) Beijing: 2008, at p. 28 f.
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absolute character and effect erga omnes, but also taken to mean that it is not merely the
result of arbitrary political and legislative choices but instead “inherent” to national,
economic, social and cultural characteristics,16 which include the finding that China is in
an initial stage of socialism, and that the Chinese national condition requires the system
of ownership it has got.17 Typically, therefore, the current property system is portrayed
as ordained by authority and best for the nation. One of this property system’s
peculiarities, however, is its combination of socialist and liberal conceptions of property,
and its related, much-criticized dualist setup distinguishing between “urban” and “rural”
land rights.18 This distinction is one of the root causes of discrimination against peasants.
Insisting on the “inherent” and “immutable” 19 character of a state-defined set of
property rules can not only facilitate acceptance of unreasonable rules, but also lead to
denying the relevance of historical changes those rules have undergone. This is the case
especially in contexts where, as in China, revolutionary changes of the legal and political
order have occurred in the relatively recent past. In the complex history of property law
in China,20 at least four eras remain relevant to the present: the era of the late Qing, the
Republican era, the socialist PRC era, and the PRC reform era. In the imperial era,
property transactions were conducted in accordance with rules that varied from place to
place, and that were recognized more than they were centrally prescribed by the imperial
16

Cai Yongmin et al, ibid at p. 26 (critically noting that China has in fact received many rules of property
law from western countries).
17
“The Six ‘Whys’” (六个”为什么”), Beijing: 2009 at p. 96 f (in answer to “Why” number six, namely
“Why the path of Reform and Opening must be continued without wavering, and why we cannot go back”).
18
On dualism in Chinese property law, see Ben James, “How the Rural Property System Exacerbates
China’s Urban Rural Gap, 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 20 (2007) 451 especially at pp. 486 et seq.;
Eva Pils, “Land Disputes, Rights Assertion and Social Unrest: a Case from Sichuan”, 19 (2006) Columbia
Journal of Asian Law 365.
19
The Chinese word used here is guyouxing (固有性).
20
A more extended description and analysis of this history is provided in Geoffrey Korff, “The Village and
the City: Law, Property and Economic Development in China,” (2008) 35 Syracuse Journal of
International Law and Commerce 399.
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government. Government largely limited itself to resolving disputes concerning
property,21 and to edicts issued to preserve its tax prerogatives and ensure, for instance,
that land was registered in some way allowing for it to be taxed.22 The Republican period
was characterized by a plurality of norms, including the still- practiced property law of
the late Qing, and the new law of the Republican codifications which were modeled on
Japanese, German, Swiss and French codes and which stood for a modernity whose
forms and instruments were to come from western civilization, even if Chinese essence
was to be preserved. In rural areas, the new codes were widely ignored.23 Families kept,
as they had done for generations, their land deeds proving traditional rights in plots of
land, and continued making transactions accordingly.24
In the socialist PRC era, the new ideas embraced, in conformity with orthodox state
socialism, repudiated private ownership as the root cause of various social ills, including
crime. 25 The socialist revolution and the first three decades of Communist Party rule
brought a gradual diminution of “capitalist” private property, through formal
expropriation decisions or through various kinds of restrictions imposed on private
property right holders. In the countryside, this culminated in the establishment of the

21

Madeline Zelin, “A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China,” in Zelin, Ocko and Gardella (eds),
Contract and Property in Early Modern China (Stanford, 2004), 17-36. Zelin points out that by deciding
cases, the government also influenced the law.
22
Discussed in Franke, Rights in real estate in China (Die Rechtsverhältnisse am Grundeigentum in China)
(Leipzig,1903).
23
Schurmann, “Traditional Property Concepts in China”, The Far Eastern Quarterly vol. 15 no. 4 (1956),
p. 508. For a discussion of different regimes under the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Parties see Lou
Jianbo, Patrick Randolph, Chinese Real Estate Law (1999) Chapter 1 (“History of Chinese Real
Estate Law”); for a more general discussion of the reception of civil law in China see Epstein,
“Codification of Civil Law in the People’s Republic of China: Form and Substance in the Reception
of Concepts and Elements of Western Private Law,” 32 U.B.C. L.Rev. 153 (1998).
24
Michael Palmer, “The Surface-Subsoil Form of Divided Ownership in Late Imperial China: Some
Examples from the New Territories of Hong Kong,” in 21 Modern Asian Studies (1987) provides a
discussion of the deed system.
25
Jerome A. Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-63: An Introduction
(Harvard, 1968).
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People’s Communes, 26 economic and political entities in which the production and
consumption of goods were almost entirely brought under centralized control, a system
that contributed to the catastrophic consequence of the 1958/59 Great Famine. Power
distribution within villages changed, and families stopped keeping the proof of
landownership that had been preserved for generations, as the deeds had become not only
useless but also “incriminating” evidence. Today, if villagers refer to historical land
ownership by entire villages rather than individual families or clans, this may be because
they have lost proof of more individuated rights. But of course, that does not mean that
they have no orally transmitted knowledge of that more detailed history; in many cases,
visitors will be told for how many generations a particular plot of land has been in a
particular family.
Since the launch of the Reform and Opening policy under Deng Xiaoping, China has
experienced another transition. It has changed from a socialist property regime premised
on the theoretical superiority of socialist public ownership of the means of production, to
the current, hybrid property regime. In 1978, according to reports now assiduously spread
by the official media, a community of peasants in Xiaogang village in Anhui province
started a prototype mechanism for distributing land use (or “usufruct”) rights of its own
accord,

at

the

time

without

statutory

basis

and

risking

incrimination

as

counterrevolutionaries, according to what is now party folklore.27 In 1986 a statutory law
for the first time enacted the principles of socialist public ownership by collectives in the

26

P.R.C. Draft directive on the work of rural People’s Communes (农村人民公社工作条例修正草案),
1962.
27
See for a description e.g. Ye Weimin (叶伟民) “Thirty Years: From people’s liberation to land
liberation; from the experience of Xiaogang to the experiment in Zhaozhuang” (30 年：从人的解放到土
地的解放. 从小岗经验到赵庄试验), Nanfang Zhoumo 16 October 2008 at
http://www.infzm.com/content/18560/1.
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countryside and by the state in urban areas, and combined this with rules allowing the
creation of land use or “usufruct” rights derived from the respective landowners.28 The
Constitution did not articulate the principles on the basis of which such new rights were
created until 1988. Over time, more and more of this new regime’s land use rights – rural
and urban - were created through grants and allocations.
A legal analysis identifying land rights in the positivistic way by reference to
“currently valid” law is problematic if “currently valid” law does not address the fate of
land rights created before the new laws were enacted. The current Chinese property
regime stipulates that urban land shall be state-owned and rural land shall be collectively
owned, 29 but does not explicitly address the individual or collective entitlements of
persons or families already living on particular plots of land, unless they can be
subsumed under the concepts created by current law. It is assumed that the previous
property regime or regimes do not matter. But as is discussed toward the end of this paper,
both land transaction practices and popular conceptions can remain divergent from what
many legally trained professionals and the “law on the books” say, and the fact of long
possession within a particular family or village is considered relevant by peasants
affected by land takings.

The utilitarian constraint. A second widely recognized type of constraint could be called
utilitarian: it says that good legal rules, policies and administrative decisions are those
that, judged by the long-term consequences of enacting them, will further the happiness
28

General Principles of Civil Law, Land Administration Law; see discussion in Huang, Xianfeng Frank,
“The Path to clarity: development of property rights in China,” 17 Columbia Journal of Asian Law
(2003/2004) 191 .
29
The rules are more detailed and complex, but this is their main import. See Articles 6 ff of the PRC
Constitution.
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or welfare of the people. One widely used metric for assessing welfare consequences is
economic growth measured by per capita GDP growth. I will refer to this kind of
argument as “the growth argument,” and show that the growth argument has been used in
different ways in the present context.
One of its classical uses in western countries has been to call for the protection of
private property rights in a market economy whose natural consequence was understood
to be growth in wealth. In China, a phrase used to express this maxim in the context of
property law is “exhaust the utility of the thing” or wu jin qi yong,30 or in a narrower but
more idiomatic translation, ‘waste not.’ Chinese property law scholars have used the neoclassical argument in order to justify the enactment of the new Chinese Property Rights
Law in 2007,31 arguing, for instance, that the new Property Rights Law would help the
poor get richer 32 by creating better conditions for secure investments and value
maximization of property. Evidently, the growth argument relies on a conception of
property as wealth.33
But scholars critical of this stance, in particular Frank Upham, 34 have shown that, on
the contrary, well-protected property rights were not needed to enable growth in China in
the early decades of its reform process, arguing that the supposed nexus between clearly
defined property rights and economic development is a myth of certain types of liberal
30

Huang Songyou (黄松有), editor, Understanding and applying the provisions of the “Property Rights
Law of the PRC”“ («中华人民共和国物权法» 条文理解与适用), Beijing: 2007 at p. 39 (物尽其用).
31
Upham uses Demsetz as most important proponent in Frank Upham, “From Demsetz to Deng:
Speculations on the Implications of China’s Growth For Law And Development Theory,” forthcoming in
JILP.
32
Interview with Yang Lixin (杨立新) in Lu Jian (吕娟) and Lu Nan (鲁楠), “Peking University Law
Professor submits letter vehemently opposing Draft Property Rights Law, delaying vote on the bill” ( 北大
教授上书激烈反对导致物权法草案推迟表决), Law and Life Magazine (法律与生活杂志) 9 February
2006 at http://www.ahjcg.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=172.
33
See for a discussion of this conception Harris, ibid.
34
Frank Upham, “From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of China’s Growth For Law
And Development Theory,” forthcoming in JILP.
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economic theory. Regardless of their stance in this debate, those who assess property
regimes in terms of their function for growth evaluate particular decisions and general
rules in the area of property law in terms of their overall economic consequences. 35
Chinese officials keep using a variant of the growth argument to justify taking property
away from individuals and other entities for construction and property development
projects “in the public interest.”
Undeniably, property development has been an important factor in GDP growth,
notwithstanding the fact that it has involved a lot of illegality. Both the authoritarian
conception of property, and the growth argument are historically associated with the
ideas of the Reform and Opening policies under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao, although these ideas have undergone some modification in recent years. A main
national goal of the reform era has been economic growth measured by reference to
national annual GDP growth. Since Deng, it has been thought that annual GDP growth
must not fall below eight percent, the “magic number”.36 When this goal was threatened
in 2008 and 2009 by the world-wide economic crisis, the government responded by
encouraging, among other things, more property development,37 reflecting the fact that
property development represents an important share of the state revenue’s contribution to
the national GDP.38 Government revenue from land rights sales (grants) has equaled or

35

By discussing property rights as the result of an enactment of particular rules, they also commit to a
positivistic understanding of law, as Upham recognizes (Ibid. p.5).
36
Russell Leigh Moses, “What Beijing’s Growth Plan Means,” Taipei Times 25 March 2009.
37
Denise Tsang, “IMF Official sees mainland as oasis of stability in global turmoil,” South China Morning
Post of 4 November 2008; Moses, ibid. Joy Shaw, “In China, Property Sales Show Signs of Picking Up,”
Wall Street Journal 12 April 2009; Stephen Chen, “Think-Tank urges Beijing to end frantic urbanization,”
South China Morning Post 16 June 2009; “Developers buy property at hefty rates to ride boom,” China
Daily 23 July 2009.
38
Cary Huang, “Going backward ever faster,” South China Morning Post 2 August 2009; Xinhua News,
“Zhou Tianyong: China’s tax burden reaches 31%” (周天勇：中国宏观税负高达 31%) , 13 July 2007 at
http://pl.smesd.gov.cn/asp/2007/03/20070316082352.asp. According to a statement attributed to Zhou
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even exceeded tax revenue in some major cities.39 Available statistics remain unreliable,
as illustrated by the fact that the sum total of provincial GDP figures did not equal the
figure of the national GDP, as officially calculated, for the first half of 2009.40
Under the current leadership, state propaganda in 2007 adopted the slogan “Scientific
Development Perspective, (kexue fazhan guan),”

41

meaning a perspective on

development that includes growth, but also sustainable development, social welfare, a
person-centered society and a harmonious society. 42 The “Scientific Development
Perspective” is now portrayed as the correct basis for economic and related policies.43 It
has been interpreted as an effort to modify the development goal by abandoning the
exclusive focus on GDP growth. 44 But the focus on “protecting growth,” in particular
GDP growth remains very important, as can be seen from the measures taken to boost
growth and to ensure that it not fall below the “magic” eight percent; and the current legal
framework for land rights, cemented by the 2007 Property Rights Law, is largely a
product of the earlier reform era in which the propagation of GDP growth as a national
goal was less restrained.
Tianyong, the volume of state revenue from land sales in 2007, for instance, was 1,2 trillion Yuan
Renminbi out of a total of internal revenue of 9 trillion Yuan Renminbi, and state revenue represented
about 36% of the national GDP. Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) as quoted in ‘Party School Professor: 4 trillion
Yuan Renminbi not counted in last year’s state revenue statistics,”(党校教授：去年财政收入少算了四万
亿) 29 August 2008 Lianhe Zaobao at http://www.360doc.com/content/080829/12/62146_1587997.html.
39
Li Guo, Jonathan Lindsay, and Paul Munro-Faure, “China: Integrated Land Policy Reform n a Context
of Rapid Urbanization,” available at the World Bank website
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/Note36.pdf. To quote, “studies consistently show
that land transfer fees account for some 30-50 percent of total sub-provincial government revenues… These
revenues are often kept off-budget, making their use non-transparent.” (at p. 3).
40
Jane Cai, “Parts greater than the GDP sum,” 4 August 2009, South China Morning Post.
41
In Chinese, 科学发展观.
42
For various formulations of the Scientific Development Perspective by President Hu Jintao and Premier
Wen Jiabao see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/16/content_2704537.htm.
43
Zhang Huaihai (张怀海 editor) 科学发展观/深入学习时实践科学发展观丛书， 人民出版社 Beijing
(2008) differentiates between different generations of development perspectives (p. 56), but leaves no
doubt that China’s development thus far has been dominated by the “growth” conception of development.
44
Joseph Fewsmith, “Promoting the Scientific Development Concept ,” China Leadership Monitor No. 11
at http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm11_jf.pdf.
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In the propaganda slogan adopted by the Ministry of Land and National Resources,
“Scientific Development Perspective” translates into the “Two Protects” - “Protect
Growth” and “Protect the Red Line” of a minimum of 1,8 trillion mu of arable land
nationwide that China must not fall below.45 While this slogan recognizes the importance
of preserving land for agricultural uses, and of balancing the goal of growth with that of
keeping arable land, the rights or individual interests of peasants are not often mentioned
in this rhetoric of national wealth; individually, peasants or other citizens do not matter to
these arguments. The following section describes how this attitude translates into a
general skepticism about whether peasants really own land, as the written law suggests
they do in a form of socialist collective ownership.

III. “They don’t own it anyway:” the arguments weakening peasant land ownership

Often, people in China will assert that “land in China is all owned by the state,” and
many news reports in the English speaking media have repeated this statement.46 In fact,
however, the 1982 PRC Constitution (as amended 2004), 1988 Land Administration Law,
2007 Property Rights Law and other legislative and Party documents say that land in the
45

See website of the Ministry for Land and Resources at
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/wszb/20090331bzzbhxdzzk/jiabin/index_999.htm.
46
See e.g. Edward Cody, “Farmers Rise in Challenge to Chinese Land Policy”, The Washington Post of 14
January 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/13/AR2008011302383.html (“all of China’s rural land is still owned by the
state”); Philip Pan, “Chinese Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute,” The Washington Post of 15 June 2005,
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/14/AR2005061401542.html.(Pan
writes, more vaguely, that “the government owns all land and gives farmers only long-term leases”); David
Stanway,, “Chinese farmers could be allowed to sell land”, The Guardian of 12 October 2008,at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/12/china (“proposals aimed at liberating 700 million peasants
from state-owned land”); Verna Yu, “China’s farmers can bank on land,” Asia Times Online of 10 October
2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/13/AR2008011302383.html (“the
Chinese Constitution, which stipulates that all land resources are owned by the state”).
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rural and suburban areas is collectively owned by “villagers’ collective economic
organizations” (whereas urban land is, indeed, owned by the state; there is no private
landownership). But these statements in the written law are also hard to accept at face
value, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the political and legal status of
collectives is widely regarded as weak, and while collectively owned land can be easily
taken away by the state, the written law does not allow collectives to figure as market
actors in commercial land transactions.
Rural households belonging to particular rural collectives can hold land use or
“usufruct” rights limited in time. Such land use rights include plots for farming
(chengbao rights) and plots for housing (zhaijidi rights). Some scholars and research
institutes have argued that the security of these land use rights should be strengthened, by
protecting them from redistribution, and extending their duration, currently limited to 30
years in most cases.47 In these arguments, rural land use rights can become part of a good
narrative of privatization to overcome “bad” (socialist) collectivization,48 following the
arguments of Hayek or De Soto in the west49 and of Chinese academics committed to
similar views in China. 50 In fact, however, land use rights are held not by individual
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For instance, Prostermann, Roy, and Zhu Keliang, “Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap
Forward for Stability and Growth,” Cato Development Policy Analysis Series, No. 3, October 15, 2007
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48
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China’s Transitional Economy” 2008 Boston University International Law Journal 97 122.
49
Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: 1944); De Soto, ibid. On the reception especially of Hayek’s
work see Liu Junning, “Classical Liberalism Catches On In China,” 2000 Journal of Democracy (11) 48.
50
In the past thirty years of “reform and opening” in China socialist views rejecting private ownership
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个人的合法权利), September 2003, at http://copies.sinoshu.com/copy3054017/. Yale-based Chen Zhiwu
argues similarly in “Returning Land to the Peasants: a Dialogue between Chen Zhiwu (陈志武) and Yu
Jianrong (于建嵘),” (对话陈志武：把地权还给农民), 14 February 2008, at
http://www.infzm.com/review/pltt/200802/t20080204_36453.shtml. See also Peter Ho, “Who Owns
China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity”(China Quarterly
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persons but by households (hu); they remain tied to the collective setup of the rural
economy. Some scholars convinced of the correctness of the neo-liberal argument have
therefore advocated an outright privatization of rural land ownership.51
Dismissively, American property law professor and practitioner Patrick Randolph
observes that “Chinese rural agricultural land has, under the Constitution, been “owned”
by agricultural collectives - mysterious socio/political organizations left over from the
early years following Liberation. Although the Collectives are said to own the land, they
could not sell it” (emphasis added).52 In a similar albeit more nuanced vein, De Lisle
observes that “[a]ny discussion of property rights in the People’s Republic of
China is in some ways an odd topic. After all, everywhere throughout the
formal Constitution and legal code in China one sees reference to it still being a socialist,
Marxist-Leninist system in one form or another, with property presumptively owned by
some collectivity, and indeed, often the state. In a technical, legal sense, of course, land
in the urban areas remains state owned, and land in the countryside remains collectively
owned…”(emphases added).53
Despite their critical nature these comments reflect a state-centered view of rural land
tenure close to the positivistic attitude mentioned above. On the state-centered view, the
state allocates things to people through the rules of property law it makes and enforces.54
On a positivistic view, property rights can be thought of as a “bundle” of composite rights

(2001) 394 at http://www.rug.nl/cds/medewerkers/peterho/isi on the repudiation of private property
under Mao.
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Perspective,” at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/randolphlinks.htm. at p. 2.
53
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Property Seizure in China: Politics, Law, and Protest,’
21 June 2004 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:94854.pdf at p. 2.
54
E.g. Huang Songyou, ibid , at p. 39, 2nd paragraph.
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(Honoré),55 and the thicker the bundle the greater the indication that someone holds “full
ownership” or “full-blooded” ownership (Harris).56 It is the rights to sell and exclude that
are most essential to someone’s characterization as an owner of a particular thing (e.g.
Penner).57 On such an account, rural collectives are indeed weak property rights holders.
Their rights to exclude and sell others appear to have been severely curtailed or entirely
denied by the state, and it is perhaps not even clear what or who these collectives
themselves are.
In the following, I discuss what the arguments weakening peasant land ownership are
and why, in my view, these arguments are flawed. In the fourth section of this article I
point out that a “weakening” conception of peasant land ownership, albeit flawed,
conforms to the growth argument: it facilitates the taking of land that is needed to achieve
GDP growth through the property sector.

The “no owner” argument. The tradition of legal positivism, on the one hand, treats
collectives as legal fictions derived from legally valid rules58 that allocate legal rights and
obligations to the collective. In the socialist and Leninist tradition, on the other hand, the
collective is an institution serving the political goals of socialism, embedded in a political
hierarchy. These two in China equally important perspectives combine to make it hard to
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accounts of this type of theory, that of H.L.A. Hart, such identification takes place through the application
of criteria of validity contained in the Rule, or Rules, of Recognition. Hart, ibid. The positivistic skepticism
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identify the Chinese rural collective as a holder of meaningful rights of ownership, as the
case of Ms L’s collective may serve to demonstrate.
Ms L, at the time of writing, individually owns a house standing on a certain
formerly collectively owned plot of land, in which she held a land usufruct or use right
called “housing plot use right.” Her land use right was derived from the collective; a
decision be the government to expropriate the collective led to the extinction of this
right.59 But which collective? Ms Loriginally set out to complain on behalf of her village,
formerly comprising a few hundred members, whose signatures in protest against
Hangzhou municipal government taking of the village’s land she gathered in late 2008,
before travelling to Beijing to present her petition to the central government and party
authorities. At that time the village was already facing the demolition of their houses by
the municipal demolition teams hired for this purpose. Then on 13 December 2008, after
her husband’s ribs were broken,60 many other villagers changed their mind. They decided
to comply with the authorities’ request to sign forms on which they “agreed” with the
compensation package they were offered, because – Ms L believes - they were afraid.61
Documents in the case indicate that Nongkou village was the collective that owned
the land in question. 62 But could the Nongkou villagers actually have brought a legal
challenge against the municipal Hangzhou government’s administrative decision? The
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This is implicit in Articles 132, 42 of the 2007 Property Rights Law (PRL). The status of her rights
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villagers may have wanted to, at least before the thugs arrived in their neighborhood and
attacked Ms L’s husband.63 However, according to Article 60 of the Property Rights Law,
“ownership of properties collectively owned by peasants shall be exercised collectively
by the village’s collective economic organization or the villagers’ committee.” 64 The
head of the villagers’ committee in Nongkou was a woman named Wang Meihua who,
according to Ms L’s allegation, had deceived the other members of the villagers’
committee by obtaining a list of their signatures in another matter, and then appending
the list of these representatives’ signatures to an “agreement” they had in fact never
seen.65 Through this alleged maneuver, the village had collectively “agreed” to the plan
to take its land away.66 Article 63 of the PRL would give Ms Ms Land others a right to
seek annulment of collective decisions infringing her individual rights by a court but this
would require her not only to substantiate an infringement of her rights, it would also be
premised on a court of law filing her complaint, which under the circumstances is very
unlikely.67 In any case, for a village to take collective legal action, it would still have to
be represented by the village cadres, who are often in collusion with the urban
government, especially in land cases; 68 and lawsuits against government decisions to
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evict and demolish will in any case not stop the enforcement of a demolition decision.69
From this it can be seen that the “collective” is a very fragile entity; its position as
landowner is undermined by its political weakness.
The situation of the Nongkou villagers may have been more complicated yet. It is not
entirely clear whether the land in question was indeed a plot owned by Nongkou village,
or whether some other collective comprising Nongkou or representing a part of it was
the owner.70 The question who belonged to this particular village or collective has not
been raised in this case but it, too, can lead to perplexing problems.71 Due to imperfect or
altogether unavailable registration and other issues, it may be difficult to determine which
particular collective owns a particular plot of land as well as who belongs to a particular
collective, and de facto, decisions are often made at the level of the administrative village
even where it is not the owner.
Yu Jianrong, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in a published
dialogue in 2007 deplored the vagueness of the identity of the collective owner as one of
the central problems of peasant land ownership. 72 From the perspective of the above
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analysis, the collective as a holder of rights and obligations is indeed a defective entity as
long as no clear allocation of rights to one or another collective is achieved. Although it
is likely that this defect affects not all but only some villages, its roots are not likely to be
cured, as long collectives are part of a power hierarchy within a state organized on
authoritarian principles and plagued by corruption.

The “no ownership” argument. Even assuming that particular collectives could be
clearly identified as holders of land rights, the bundle of rights held by these nominally
“landowning” collectives may be too thin for them to be real owners, because they cannot
sell land, and because their private-law-based right to exclude others from the use of their
land seems worthless in confrontations with the government. Not only are they not
allowed to sell, they are also widely powerless against the government taking and selling
rights in “their” land.
Article 39 of China’s recent (2007) Property Rights Law (PRL) says that “An
owner shall enjoy the rights to possess, use, seek the fruits (benefits) of and alienate his
own immovable or movable property pursuant to the law” (emphasis added).73 Article 39
PRL applies in a general way to all three kinds of owners of property recognized by
China’s hybrid property regime, which according to Article 4 enjoy “equal protection.”
Article 39 thus seems to apply to collective rural landowners as much as to private
individuals and the state.
But although the PRL fails to mention it, another law says that Chinese rural
collectives are not allowed to alienate land they hold as owners. The 1986 PRC Land
Administration Law (LAL, last revised 2004) states in its Article 2 that “no unit or
73
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individual is allowed to occupy or trade land, or illegally to transfer land by other
means.”74; but the rural land use rights of peasants cannot be legally transferred “for nonagricultural purposes” according to Article 62 of the LAL, and this rule applies to both
residential plot (zhaijidi) and to land management (chengbao) use rights. 75 From the
perspective of enacted, written legislation, then, Articles 2 and 62 LAL answer the
question about alienability in the negative: peasants cannot legally transfer land, except
for a transfer of rural land use rights for purposes attributed to rural land (i.e. mainly
agriculture). Land use rights pertaining to urban (and hence state-owned) land, on the
other hand, can be transferred, and such transfers will be protected by law according to
the rules of the LAL and PRL.
Similarly, while the PRL in its Articles 2, 34 and 35 stipulates the right of property
rights holders to exclude third persons76 in ways functionally equivalent to the trespass
rules of common law property systems, 77 these rules acquire little meaning in the
relationships between individual peasant household and the collective, 78 and between
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peasant collectives and the government. Given the practical significance of government
takings of rural land, illustrated by the numbers quoted at the beginning of this article, it
is government takings that are the most real and important “threat” to rural land tenure.
Use of the expropriation mechanism, while verbally resembling mechanisms used in
western jurisdictions, is the rule not the exception in cases of urban or infrastructural
construction.79 Expropriation is governed by Article 13 of the PRC Constitution, Article
42 of the PRL and the more detailed rules contained in the LAL and its Implementation
Regulation.
Ms L is well acquainted with these rules. Were the villagers of Nongkou able to sell
(some of) the land of their village, they might have done so. They could perhaps have
made better plans for their future. In fact, in Nongkou, the villagers were forced to
supplement income from agriculture after a first round of land takings in the 1990s,80 and
they resorted to building houses on the remaining land in which, with permission by the
local officials,81 they rented out flats to urban residents. When the second decision to take
the remainder of their land was announced to them, they were not only facing the loss of
the value of that land, but also the loss of the houses they had built only a few years ago
in order to generate a new income out of the remaining land.82
Since no right to sell and no clear right to exclude others can be “found” in the law
on collective rural land ownership, Randolph’s and De Lisle’s misgivings are apparently
confirmed. Collective rural land ownership is not really ownership in the “full-blooded”

“questions whether the terms of any licence have been infringed….are settled according to the spirit of the
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classical and positivistic understanding; 83 it is at best a deficient sort of “ownership,”84
“at the mercy of the government.”85 In the language of Calabresi and Melamed, one could
say that the rules on collectively owned land viewed in their entirety, were not “property
rules” in the sense of rules “giving an individual the right to keep an entitlement unless
and until he chooses to part with it voluntarily” but merely “liability rules” – rules
denying an individual the right to keep the thing in question (here: land) but entitling him
to compensation when it is taken away.86

The argument for recognition of peasant land ownership. The problems with identifying
the rural collective as a holder of land rights undeniably present obstacles to
understanding the rural collective as an independent legal person holding rights to be
exercised freely through a collective decision-making process. But as the case of Ms L
well illustrates, they had no impact on her belief that the land of Nongkou belonged to the
villagers of Nongkou, and it would be hard to argue that her belief was unjustified. After
all, the authorities treated the collective as an owner when they sought its collective
“agreement” to the land taking - never mind that this “agreement” was apparently
fraudulently obtained. Without doubt, moreover, Ms L legally owns the house now
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threatened with demolition, 87 from which the authorities have already removed the
furniture and other belongings. Ms L believes that if only the government had not
resorted to brutal violence, the other villagers of Nongkou would stand behind her in
legitimate resistance to an illegal (they argue) taking of their land. She would not be
much impressed by the argument that it was not clear which collective owned the land of
Nongkou village.
As a natural community, a collective entity like Nongkou is not “mysterious”
(Randolph) or “ambiguous” (Huang)88 at all. Our grasp of its existence does not depend
on our ability precisely to associate it with particular people or particular plots of land.89
The collective as landowner appears fragile, weak, or vague only from the perspective of
the state that views collectives as entities defined by the measurements of membership,
location and land.90 From its viewpoint, it may seem true that “in China, all land is owned
by the state” – ultimately the party-state controls the collectives, and the less serious the
efforts of the legal system to provide courts in which arbitrary exercise of power can be
challenged, the less point there may be in pondering the question if a particular exercise
of power by the village leadership, for instance, was based in “good legal authority” or
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merely in power abuse.91 The narrower factual question of what rules have been created
dissolves into the wider factual question of what the institutions in power do with or
without authorization. But collectives, like other legal entities, cannot simply be
understood by reference to a power that allows them to exist and defines their boundaries;
they have legal significance also by virtue of their social reality. The authoritarian
definition ignores this reality. It relies on a correct identification of the power that
represents the law’s source; but if law is understood in this simplistic way, it may easily
be challenged by counter-assertions of power.
In a case in Jiangsu Province, for instance, the villagers of Shengzhuang found their
identity and voice in protest, and it led them to contend the party-state’s view of the
meaning and function of the rural collective in the following terms.

“We would like to ask, (…) whose collective is ‘the collective?’ Each time new
land was possessed [in a takings process], the whole village [the people of the
entire village] disagreed, the whole village signed their names in open protest; and
yet the village head and the township party secretary forcibly ‘represented’ the
whole village in the name of the collective. Aren’t these people just like the
corrupt officials, the land grabbers and bad gentry that Chairman Mao had called
on us to overturn?”92
Similarly, the “argument against land ownership” by rural collectives, though apparently
compelled by classic theories of ownership that regard the right to exclude as a central or
even indispensable feature of property (cp. Art 2 PRL) and assess property by its market
utility associated with alienability (cp. Art 39 PRL), is the result of a state-centered
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perspective. “Seeing like a state” the authorities are unwilling to acknowledge the legally
and morally problematic discriminatory implications of legal rules. These rules
disallowing make second-class property right holders of peasants, even though socialist
public ownership is often described as one of the fundamentals of the Chinese legal
system.93 The original purpose of this arrangement was to spell out a socialist principle
and provide special protections of ownership and ensuring collective decisions over land
use. While this goal was once to be attained by withdrawing rural land from the reach of
commercial activity, changed laws and altered circumstances have now brought about a
situation in which the peasants have become helpless victims of the land’s
commercialization from which they, the designated owners according to the Constitution
and PRL, are excluded. If we chose to interpret the position of rural collectives in the
light of classical property theory, then, we would be forced to add rationalization to
injury by concluding that peasants did not, after all, “really” own the land that is taken
from them.
The above analysis has prompted at least one academic commentator to argue that
because the peasants “own” land, and in light of the new Article 39 PRL, they “ought to”
have a right to alienate it. 94 In fact, Chinese peasants have some good constitutional
arguments for claiming that they already have rights to alienate land. As mentioned above,
the current Chinese property regime bears traces of an historical shift from socialist to
liberal principles. While Art 2 of the 1988 LAL strictly prohibits the sale of land, the
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2007 PRL is silent on this important restriction, and in fact the sale of urban land use
rights is the basis of the urban real estate market.95 The constraints currently placed on
rural land right holders discriminate against peasants and are in tension with the general
principle of equal protection of the law contained in Article 33 of the Constitution, for
instance. They are also in tension with the idea of “equal protection” of individuals,
collectives and the state as property holders explicitly upheld in Article 4 Property Rights
Law.96
For any of the above arguments to have immediate practical significance, however,
there would have to be a reasonable system to decide which one(s) of competing rules or
principles prevailed, and to ensure that the norm hierarchy that places the PRC
Constitution at the top was respected.97 But no such rules or mechanisms exist in China’s
authoritarian political environment; and political or legal challenges to particular rules of
the law such as we are used to observing in systems with a vibrant parliamentary and
judicial practice are very difficult. Available mechanisms have been tried, for instance by
Professor Hu Xingdou who in 2004 petitioned in vain for a change in the household
registration and land tenure system to rid it of its discriminatory elements.98 His petition
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remained unanswered; and the institutional reason for this is that there is no obligation on
the part of the institutions (The NPC Standing Committee) to provide any answer; nor is
there any other truly functional mechanism of constitutional or judicial review of
norms.99 Instead of waiting for a decision, or of waiting for legislative reforms, rural
communities in China have in many cases decided to circumvent the law and “sell” their
land anyway, as is briefly discussed below in section V.

IV. “It is better if we take it from them:” arguments for expropriation

It could be seen in the example of Nongkou village that according to allegations made by
villagers, the procedure leading up to the taking of land from Nongkou was marred by
illegality in several ways: the village head was alleged to have procured fellow village
committee members’ signatures in a fraudulent way; the authorities allegedly intimidated
the majority of villagers into “agreeing” to specific compensation plans by hiring thugs
who carried out a brutal assault on one villager; and the taking exceeded the limits of the
approval the municipal government of Hangzhou had obtained. Instead of taking two
square kilometers for an intended railway station construction project, 100 the villagers
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said, the city had kept extending the scope of the taking and ultimately ended up taking
about twenty. 101 Most of the land taken would be used for commercial housing
construction projects.102 According to the allegations, all of Nongkou’s land was outside
the area that would have been originally affected by the two-square-kilometer taking. 103
Each of these mentioned problems would, if true, undermine the legality of the
takings process affecting the village. But it remains important to understand that the land
of Nongkou could have been legally taken, as long as the taking was justified by “the
needs of public interest” and obtained higher-level approval. This requires a discussion of
“public interest” in rural land takings, in a situation in which the land to be taken by the
government could not be sold privately on a free and generally accessible private
property market. 104 In the following it is explained why the utilitarian logic of “not
wasting” and achieving economic growth is served well by a property system that
weakens property rights on the part of peasants yet strengthens them for those involved in
the process of property development, and adapts the interpretation of “public interest” to
suit this overall goal.
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The economic efficiency argument behind the recent property law reform. In the run-up
to its enactment in March 2007, the drafters of the new PRL were overflowing with
neoclassical “liberal” rhetoric in support of the draft law, while careful also to make
reference to China’s “socialist market economy.” It was argued that economic growth in
China had entirely relied on and would continue to rely on the protection of property
rights based on the legal reforms described earlier on, which started in the early 1980s.
The drafters of the PRL argued that the proposed “represented the brilliant political
decisions of three generations of Party Central leaders,”105 and that its enactment would
be “a monument and conclusion to twenty years of Reform and Opening [and] to the
socialist market economy.” 106 A critical observer had commented already in 2000 that
Hayek’s popularity “is attributed to the fact that he’s the most anti-socialist economist
around.”
Neoclassical arguments for private individual property rights could be grouped into
three kinds: the argument based in historical entitlement, claiming that property is held
justly if justly acquired (e.g. Nozick); 107 the argument based in liberty, seeking to
establish a right to private property of certain resources (e.g. Locke);108 and the argument
based in efficiency, claiming that private property rights increase efficiency or utility
more than any other type of property regime (e.g. Hayek, Demsetz). 109 Hayek argued
that only competitive liberal systems founded on private property are efficient enough to
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produce the kind of growth required in modern society. Only a competitive price system
“records all relevant data,” a task central (state) planning is unable to perform.

“Modern civilization has been possible precisely because it did not have to be
consciously created. The division of labor has gone far beyond what could have
been planned. Any further growth in economic complexity, far from making
central direction more necessary, makes it more important than ever that we
should use the technique of competition and not depend on conscious control.”110
A central assumption underlying Demsetz’ analysis and his critical argument against
communal property rules is that private owners view their property as wealth, and will be
incentivized to maximize the value of their land, in ways communal owners would not be.

“Property rights (…) help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably
hold in his dealings with others. (…) If a single person owns land, he will attempt
to maximize its present value by taking into account alternative future time
streams of benefits and costs and selecting that one which he believes will
maximize the present value of his privately owned land rights.” 111
As a consequence, over time, and assuming (as this theory does) that people will make
rational decisions oriented toward value maximization, private property rights will lead to
growth in wealth. The distribution of such wealth is by definition not in the focus of
interest of this kind of theory. Some neo-liberal authors have argued explicitly that
disparity of wealth may be viewed as morally irrelevant (Nozick)112 or that redistribution
motivated by “socialist” conceptions of equality is an unjustifiable invasion of liberty for
no justifiable goal (Hayek).113
110

Hayek, ibid, p. 52.
Harold Demsetz, ibid.
112
Nozick’s argument against distributive justice is articulated especially in chapter 7 of Anarchy, State,
and Utopia - he believes that any distributive pattern is “overturnable” by the voluntary actions of persons,
and that distributive justice conceptions require coercive redistributive measures that unjustifiably limit a
person’s choices.
113
Hayek’s argues that “property is the foundation of liberty,” that socialist forms of ownership lead to an
“equality of servitude,” and that redistribution cannot achieve absolute equality. The Road to Serfdom.

111

32

The property reform establishment in China – experts of property law pushing for
the enactment of the current PRL – used neo-liberal arguments. But it did not focus on
the idea of just acquisition and did not accord great weight to the idea of natural property
rights.114 “Just acquisition” in the current Chinese situation presents problems that are the
subject of this article. The notion of natural rights to private property and related theories,
on the other hand, would have supported the idea of a “law beyond law” rejected in many
other contexts in China, not to mention its contradiction with official propaganda related
to socialism.
In its defence of the property law, which became necessary when orthodox Marxists
protested against the draft of the Property Rights Law, 115 the academic establishment
concentrated on the growth argument: on the utilitarian notion that “the utility of the
thing” should be “exhausted” (wu jin qi yong) and that utility maximization could be
achieved by protecting private property rights, including notably urban land use rights.
“Waste No Land;” maximize value, grow rich fast and – in the famous phrase attributed
to China’s former President Deng Xiaoping, “let a few people grow rich first.”
Challenged to respond publicly to critics pointing out growing social disparity amongst
rich and poor, 116 the PRL drafters asserted that the protection of property rights would
not only spur growth but also eventually help the poor get richer. Echoes of Demsetz’s
and Hayek’s arguments can be found in much of what the proponents of the PRL said in
the tense months before its enactment in March 2007. The most important scholar behind
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the PRL in its final, enacted shape, Professor Wang Liming of Renmin University,
combined the language of economic theory with a quotation from the Chinese classics:

“Mengzi said, “Having steadiness of mind without a steady income/wealth [chan
产] is within the ability only of the masters [shi 士] only, ordinary people cannot
be perseverant even when they have a steady income/wealth.” The Property
Rights Law has now created a complete set of rules that affirms and protects
property rights. This way, people can truly build up wealth [chan] and confidently
make investments, [they can develop] the desire to put aside wealth and have a
motivation for being entrepreneurial”117
This, while not flattering to entrepreneurs, traces the tenets of the neo-classical argument
for property rights and their function for growth. Similarly, Professor Yang Lixin said:

The divide between the poor and the rich is not a problem of the Property Rights
Law. It is a problem of society. The protection of the law guides people in the
sense that if you have one buck, can’t you develop it to ten thousand bucks, or a
million bucks? [The Property Rights Law] encourages people to acquire wealth
by legal means. It encourages the poor to make money.” 118
Professor Wang Weiguo went even further in extolling the virtues of a private property
regime by commenting

“Even if someone begs, this still involves [the same] rules. Begging someone for
food indeed shows respect for the property rights of another, and when a
“gentleman acts charitably,” the one who is begged from exercises his right of
disposal, handing a part of his property over. This is in fact an order without
which even beggars could not exist.” 119
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It is unclear how convincing the Chinese public considered these arguments. The PRL
was eventually enacted in March 2007, but not after some effort had been spent on
suppressing continued public criticism of this new legislation.120 Since its enactment, the
Property Rights Law, along with the Chinese Constitution, has become one of the laws
Chiense petitioners against land grabs and rural and urban evictions will refer to in their
protests; like others, Ms L wrote the titles of these laws in red paint on the façade of her
condemned house.121 But how far do these laws really protect against takings?

“Cheap” land through government takings. Takings of rural land are governed by the
Constitution (Article 13), the Land Administration Law and Property Rights Law and
further legal provisions. Article 13 of the PRC Constitution, revised in 2004, says that the
state “may, for the public interest, expropriate or take over private property of citizens for
use in the public interest,122 and pay compensation in accordance with the law.”
When drafting the new 2007 Property Rights Law, the question how to define
“public interest” was one of the hotly debated issues, and various definitions were
suggested. All of the suggested definitions of “public interest” would have had the effect
of narrowing down the scope of takings by offering specifying criteria of “public
interest” or by enumerating types of situation in which a “public interest” in the taking
would be given. The scholar Ms LHuixing, for instance, suggested in his draft Property
120
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Rights Law disallowing all projects except those “serving public roads and
communications, public health, prevention of calamity, scientific and cultural education,
environmental protection, protection of cultural relics and scenic areas, protection of
headwaters and harbors, protection of forests, and other public interests as stipulated in
constitutional law.” 123
It is not surprising that in its final form, the PRL contained none of these carefully
debated and well-meant restraining conditions and definitions. Including them would
have been against the dominant philosophy of economic growth embraced by China’s
lawmakers. There is no legal alternative to government takings of rural land, if such land
is to be transformed into land for urban construction. This fact explains not only the
enormous scale of land takings from rural collectives, but also the fact that the “public
interest” requirement, though in wording the same as in other jurisdictions, has very little
meaningful restricting function in the Chinese context. A wide definition of “public
interest” gives more power to the government, but also helps economic development by
allowing construction projects to go forward. Functionally, the expropriation replaces
voluntary transfers of rural land to urban developers in commercial transactions, because
the law does not allow for voluntary, commercial transfers.
If public interest is equated with a supposed national interest in construction and
urbanization, there is no principled reason left for distinguishing between infrastructural
projects such as roads, hospitals, or railway stations, and other construction projects such
as that of the building of a new commercial or residential area. This, precisely, is the idea
reflected by numerous government authorities and committees for demolition and
relocation around the country. The logic of “necessary” construction, urbanization and
123
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growth is upheld and propagated even as the state produces rules and circulars requiring
curbs on land takings, emphasizes existing approval requirements, proclaims the “Two
Protects” to emphasize the concurrent need to preserve agricultural land, and designates
areas of “basic agricultural land” not allowed to be expropriated.124
So far as the general aim of contributing to growth through property development is
concerned, the land taking that was approved by higher authorities and the land taken in
excess of the approved area do not appear significantly different in the case of Nongkou
village, because both serve the purpose of construction. The entire expropriation, from a
national perspective, may still be viewed as furthering GDP growth: it spurs the
construction industry, contributes more valuable land to the urban real estate market, and
if property values rise, further raises the GDP through the market transactions occurring
on this market.
This, at least, is the view generally taken by government authorities and committees,
such as the Authority Directing the Urban Renewal and Demolition and Relocation Work
of Jianggan District. Such authorities portray “support for construction” as a civic duty;
and perhaps this goes some length toward explaining why pressure, threats and violence
are applied against residents in order to obtain their “agreement.” State authorities claim
that they are enforcing a moral duty owed by individual residents to the wider community.
In a public announcement dated 24 January 2008, for instance, the Authority chastised 18
householders in an area close to Nongkou for not having signed “agreements” regarding
their eviction and compensation packages yet. It said that “in order to safeguard the
timely beginning of the construction project and the common interests of the masses”
124
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these residents, listed by name, were required to sign their “agreements” within seven
days. Otherwise they would “be dealt with through legal, administrative and other
measures.”125 As mentioned above, later that year Fan Yongsheng was attacked by thugs
in an attempt to intimidate another group of residents belonging to Nongkou village.
Once one assumes that urbanization projects are an overriding need and that affected
citizens have a civic duty to promote it by agreeing to have their land and homes taken,
individual residents’ such as Ms L’s opposition to the taking of their land and home
becomes as irrelevant, as it becomes impossible to take into account these residents’
wrongs; to regard them as problems flawing the urban renewal process. In particular, it
becomes difficult to measure the value of what is lost to them by any other metric than
that of monetary value. Viewed impersonally, the fact that expropriations are
involuntary126 can only matter to the goal of economic growth, if and insofar as it leads to
costs detracting from this goal. As seen in the example of the Nongkou village, the
developers do, in fact, incur some expenditure in dealing with the negative effects of land
takings, usually in collaboration with officials. They need to resettle and/or to some
extent compensate the peasants, at rates of compensation which, while they may be far
from low, are unlikely to reach the level of negotiated market prices. The fact that the
authorities, or property developers in collusion with the authorities, coerce villagers into
signing “agreements” about compensation, and that they suppress resistance by to some
extent violent means, does not as such detract from the success of the property
development project, as long as success is defined in growth terms. The land thus taken
from peasants is thus relatively cheap for the developers and governments, as discussed
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further in section V. 127 This is not to say that criminal activity such as assaults on
evictees, or taking bribes, never have adverse consequences for the perpetrators, of
course. But neither the perpetration nor the prosecution of such offences can disturb the
successful completion of urban development projects. The case of Jianggan district in
Hangzhou, where Liang’s house is situated, provides an example in point. In April 2009 a
vice-mayor of Hangzhou was quietly taken into shuanggui party detention (an illegal
form of detention outside formal law enforcement) on suspicion of having taken tens of
millions of Yuan Renminbi of bribes from local property developers; this fact did not
become public knowledge until domestic media reports emerged in August 2009, when
he was divested of his official (government) functions. A few days after these first
reports,128 another forceful demolition was carried out near Nongkou village.129

The incompleteness of the economic argument. At first glance, the fact that the drafters of
the PRL subscribed to the logic of “liberalism” and absolute property rights is at odds
with the fact that China achieved very impressive growth - at the same time as it also
achieved great poverty reduction – by keeping the protection of private property rights
and rules of the property law, as well as wider institutional law enforcement, weak.
Upham has argued, therefore, that the conventional argument, used by the World Bank
and other institutions, that economic development depended on the creation of clear,
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strong and enforceable property rights did not work, at least not in those early decades of
the Reform and Opening period when the protection of property rights was weak.130
From the perspective of the present analysis, however, it is possible and even likely
that the creation of strong property rights, available on a commercial real estate market,
was crucial to economic growth, so far as growth was achieved through the construction
and real estate market. For there are indications that real estate accounts for an important
proportion of the national GDP, and what is traded on the real estate market are legally
protected property rights. “Minor” property rights that are not legally protected are traded
at a “discount” for illegality or informality, quite similar to what De Soto discusses in the
case of informally held property in Peru, where the price of such “informal” property is
lower.131 So far as economic development was achieved through property development, it
appears to have followed, at least in the majority of cases,132 the creation of precisely the
kind of property rights that the law and development “orthodoxy”133 contemplates.
But this does not mean that the classical or “orthodox” argument for clear and secure
property rights, relying on a causal connection between such property rights and
economic growth. is correct. It means even less that this argument is morally attractive.
Applied to the Chinese case, the argument is fatally incomplete, because it fails to
address the possibility of property rights discrimination. Property rights discrimination
has been a striking feature of the Chinese property regime, and it appears to have been an
enabling condition for China’s rapid economic growth. For on the basis of the present
analysis, it is also true that an effective protection of their property rights has been denied
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to tens of millions of peasants (as well as to urban residents affected by “demolition and
relocation” in many cases falling outside the scope of this article). In fact, the denial of
protection in the context of takings processes has been the direct precondition sine qua
non for many (or most) urban land use rights grants, and therefore a precondition of rapid
urban property development. In 2007, in their laudations of the draft Property Rights Law
soon to be enacted, its proponents failed to mention this fact, although some of the
drafters were well aware of it.134
What unites the establishment’s rhetoric of protecting property rights with the
practice of denying such rights protection in takings processes, then, is the nature of the
justifications relied on, both in rhetoric and practice – both are utilitarian in nature and
represented as ultimately furthering economic growth. The strategy of argument flips
from destruction to construction – literally and figuratively - in the moment in which new
urban land use rights are created and distributed by urban governments: until then,
welfare arguments justified taking land and destroying the buildings on it, but from then
on, welfare is to be increased by protecting the property rights of the new owners -predominantly albeit not necessarily urban property developers and urban residents.
The new urban land use rights created out of these processes may well have been
better protected than the rights of the expropriated peasants and evicted residents (rural
and urban) making way for them. It was these urban land use rights that became the
“building blocks” 135 of the booming real estate market responsible for so much of
China’s economic growth until 2007 or 2008, a market described by one exulting
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observer as “one of the greatest real estate booms in world history” and “a truly
remarkable development in a nation in which all land still is owned by the state [sic] and
the state is firmly controlled by a single political party that remains Communist at least in
name.” 136 If, as seems prima facie likely, “secure property rights” did spur economic
growth, such secure rights rested on takings from another part of the population
(including peasants and original occupants of older urban residences).
This practice accords with an understanding of property based in the maxim “exhaust
the utility of the thing.” It also calls to mind argumentative strategies employed elsewhere
in place and time to justify taking land away from entrenched local populations making
economically less “efficient” use of the land. One of the best known cases may be that of
the European settlers on Amerindian land in the 17th and 18th centuries. Using Locke’s
theory of rights to property in land that one had “mixed one’s labor” with, apologists of
colonialism at the time argued that settling on the land and staking out private property
claims on it was morally correct and even laudable, because it served to increase the
land’s value without harming the original occupants. 137 As in the present context, the
justification of the colonial process also relied on first arguing that the current occupants
of the land had not really got ownership rights in it,138 and then arguing that occupation
would spur growth. As in colonial contexts, so also in China, some of the language
created to describe the new property developments tends to reflect the perspective of the
acquirers. Thus, for instance, a colloquial way of referring to land ready for construction
teams is “cleared” or “clean” land (jingdi 净地) whereas the land that still has buildings
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on it is referred to as “hairy land” (maodi 毛地) – a little as though the occupants of such
land and their homes were like hairs to be plucked out.139
Of course, the officials of expanding city governments, property developers and
urban homebuyers are in many ways very different from colonialists conquering (in the
language of the time) another people’s land: they are citizens of the same state and share
much of peasants’ cultural identity. However, there is considerable social prejudice
against peasants as a social group in China; they are by some seen as forces of
backwardness, possessing “low quality,” and requiring to be “raised” to the level of the
modern (and urban) Chinese citizen.140 The effect of such prejudice can be heightened by
difference in income levels, at the same time as poverty may prevent peasants from
articulating and realizing demands for information and protection of their rights. In the
case of the relatively affluent villagers of Nongkou, on the other hand, there was
allegedly an official perception that the villagers were “too rich” and “too greedy,”141 a
perception a website commenting on the “too rich” homes of peasants in the area may
illustrate.142
In the case of peasants affected by reforestation and similar programmes (not
urbanization) in a certain township of Ningxia, one of China’s poorest provinces, the
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author was told that “as a rule” peasants affected by takings would be told that their land
was taken, but not whether or when they would be given any compensation. The
economic destitution of those affected played a great role in stifling any effort to oppose
the takings and related arrangements. 143 In one case, the government gave 400 Yuan
RMB per household for the land and buildings it took from a couple living in Yinwa, a
natural village that collectively owned the land. But it then sent officials to ask for 16,000
Yuan RMB per household as fees to move residents into new houses on supposedly better
plots of land. Living in extreme poverty, the couple’s only chance of obtaining better
terms for the removal from their home village was by organizing collective opposition to
this scheme from all thirty households in the village; but they knew, Mr Ma said, that in
the end they would have no chance. The government could cut off their electricity and
come and demolish their house; then they would have to leave, whether or not they could
afford to participate in the relocation programme. 144 The project in question here was a
programme for removing peasants from land too arid to support agriculture. The
programme is described as according with “Scientific Development Perspective” by the
County government of Tongxin and while it is not an “urbanization” project, it is
described as a project for “concentrating rural residents.”145 Its intended effects for the
national economy and ecology are beneficial; and it may in addition have led to
construction projects raising GDP growth; yet for the elderly residents of Yinwa village,
the measure seemed devastating.
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From cases like these, affecting peasants living in great poverty, as well as from the
Hangzhou case affecting peasants living in comparative affluence, it can be seen that the
two growth-oriented arguments for and against property protection for different groups in
society are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Upham, then, is correct in pointing
out that growth has been made possible by massive denials of property rights. But this
does not entirely undermine the Demsetzian, Hayekian argument for strong property
rights to enable prosperity, as it has been used by Chinese proponents of the PRL (quoted
above). These arguments have not been directly refuted; rather the Chinese example
shows that the economic theory of property at its basis is consistent with discrimination.
It is consistent with the aim of furthering economic growth to take property away from
one group and give it to another. The group at the receiving end of this transfer may then
go on to engage in economic activity on the “liberal” or libertarian principles envisaged
by the classics of neo-liberal economic thought. Empirical evidence, in particular the
statistical evidence mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, is not reliable enough
to quantify the extent to which the creation of secure and stable urban land use rights has
been crucial to the creation of wealth, nor can the stability of these urban rights be
asserted with perfect certainty. But it is hard to doubt that the real estate market based on
these rights has made some contribution to economic growth in China and we cannot
overlook the fact that the property regime consolidated over the past two decades has on
the whole protected the new urban land use right holders, and sought to solve their
problems. One of the celebrated successes of the 2007 Property Rights Law, for instance,
was that it solved the problem of allocating rights in parking lots and similar common
spaces in residential compounds.146
146
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It is the considerations of “protecting growth” (bao zeng), to use the abovementioned
words of the Land and Resources Ministry, that provide the state with a plausible reason
for taking away the land and homes of Nongkou village, and replacing the three-to-five
storey houses built upon it by the peasants with taller, even more valuable buildings built
by property developers, who can afford to pay the municipal government and its officials
and still through their own economic activity spur further growth.147 Viewing the actions,
legal and illegal, of the government against the villagers of Nongkou in their totality, it
becomes clear how powerless they are against the inexorable logic of growth that is now
touted even by the Ministry for the Administration of Land and National Resources, 148
and that also underlies, it seems, many of the illegal land takings. The Ministry does, it is
true, also proclaim the national goal of preserving a minimum area of arable land (bao
hongxian). 149 But as is well-documented, this “national goal” has had a hard time in
recent years to contend with the need and desire for growth. 150 The failure of the
judiciary and other authorities to help implement even the existing laws intended to
provide protection to peasants 151 has the consequence, whether intended or not, of
supporting this supposed need. The present discussion has shown, therefore, that as
applied to China, the argument for property rights has been elliptical: it has tended to
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emphasize the creation of “new” rights and keep silent about the “old” property rights
destroyed on the basis of the same principle of “exhaust the utility of the thing.”

V. Understanding land rights through land wrongs

The problem with the growth argument, as discussed above, is thus not that it does not
work but that its implications are morally deeply unattractive. The conception of property
as wealth built on it should be rejected. A better conception of property is not purely
wealth-based; a better justification for the protection of property rights does not rely on
the likelihood of particular rules of property law promoting growth.

Understanding wrongs beyond compensation. Discussions around the issue of
compensation for land takings can illustrate this. There is some debate about the question
of how the peasants’ losses of land should be compensated: in terms of lost agricultural
production for a certain number of years, or in terms of prospective market value.
According to the rules of the LAL and further regulations compensation to rural
communities requires no more than compensation for lost agricultural production during
thirty years at maximum, and some further items of compensation such as compensation
for green crops.152Currently, therefore, compensation is for lost agricultural value. The
value of lost agricultural production and fair market value may differ very widely.
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There are arguments on both sides of this debate. One the one hand, one may point
out that since peasant communities own the land, rather than merely being tenants on it,
the losses caused to them by expropriation exceed those of tenants deprived of the
prospective income during the time of their lease, and compensation they receive ought to
reflect that fact. On the other hand, it is not immediately clear that it would be fairer
toward an expropriated rural community to provide compensation to that community on
the basis of the prospective market price; even less that it would be fair for the
community to keep the full value of the market price, assuming that such a market price
could be successfully estimated prospectively. For instance, there might be good reasons
to tax the community in question, just as there might be if the community, a rich
landowner, had been able to sell the land and gain a lot of money through the sale.
It is in any case not self-evident either that the price of land determined by a market
process would be fair or that compensating the evicted with the market price would make
evictions from their land and homes fair. Recalling the example of Mr. Ma in Yinwa
Village, for instance, it is not clear how much money, if any, might have been obtained
by selling the land his village is situated in – it is arid and difficult to cultivate, and it sits
on top of a hill that cannot be accessed by car. Yet it is intuitively clear that forcing him
and his wife off the land that supports their meager existence, giving them just 400 Yuan
RMB but making their resettlement conditional upon the payment of 16,000 Yuan RMB

household was on average one Chinese acre (mu 亩) and the market price per acre was over USD 73,000.
And the money was not paid in full; in some cases, it was not paid at all. People between 18 and 40 yrs old
were promised lump sum payments of under USD 1000.

48

which the couple do not have, is not fair. They will end up uprooted, and perhaps even
more deprived than before.153
In the case of Ms L, on the other hand, deducting her investment of 600,000 Yuan
in her house, about to be demolished, and 210,000 yuan in “fees” demanded by the
government for the family’s relocation, from the sum of 1,300,000 Yuan she has been
offered in compensation, she would get less than 500,000 Yuan Renminbi and 40 years of
government housing in a flat in a less eligible location than Nongkou. 154 The urban land
use rights to “her” land (meaning the land formerly owned by Nongkou village, in which
she held land use rights), half a Chinese mu situated in a prime location, will be sold for
about 30,000,000 Yuan Renminbi;155 and she and her husband will not obtain any new
land use right, or ownership of the flat they have been offered. According to her
information, then, she is offered far less than the land’s market value, but she would not
be left destitute. Yet what is the value, in monetary terms, of her nine months of
petitioning the Beijing authorities against an illegal expropriation, living in constant fear
of reprisals? How to count her husband’s broken ribs, and her daughter’s troubles at
school, all of which have been brought about by her resistance to the taking which, as
explained above, was legally flawed in several respects? How to count the value that Ms
Lapparently attributed to living in Nongkou as her husband’s ancestral village? 156
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What is wrong about the expropriations and what is lost through them cannot be
(fully) captured by reference to lower-than-market-value compensation; nor indeed can it
be fully measured “from outside:” for instance, we cannot tell how important it would be
to Ms Lor to Ma to continue living in their respective old neighborhoods, and why. If
someone sold their land and got a bad deal, this might be wrong from various angles - e.g.
if the seller had been under undue pressure from economically more powerful buyers; or
if their commercial inexperience had been exploited. But such a deal would not be wrong
for the same reasons as are discussed here.
What is wrong about the current expropriation mechanism is at least also that the
peasants have no say in it; that they are given no real choice and may be lied to,
threatened and physically harmed if they seek to assert themselves, all in the name of
asserted national interests in urban construction and economic growth. Yet this is an
injustice that cannot be understood from the “Scientific Development Perspective” or the
(simpler) perspective of the growth argument, because from such a perspective, the harm
done to peasants is exhausted in monetizing their losses, and can therefore be
compensated. From the perspective of the growth argument, property must be understood
as wealth that can be measured. Because the growth argument is consequentialist and
utilitarian in nature, because it looks to the welfare consequences of a particular property
distribution or redistribution; it must assume that such consequences are measurable.157
But by understanding peasant responses as mere demands for better compensation, and
implicitly accepting the fact that peasants have no chance to fight the loss of their
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property - in the sense of ‘property as thing’ not merely ‘as wealth’158 the peasants are
exposed to another, subtler wrong. Even sympathetic commentators highly critical of the
current ‘dualist’ system tend to resign themselves to such a viewpoint.159
The growth argument and the conception of property as wealth are therefore
subject to criticisms that have been leveled at consequentialist and utilitarian arguments
in general. A general argument against utilitarianism is that it cannot make sense of the
idea of wrongs done to individuals, because there could always be considerations of
collective welfare overriding these wrongs. Applying this criticism to the present case,
certain aspects of what is wrong about not letting the peasants make a decision about
their land have nothing to do with the substantive correctness of what the decision is, but
with whose decision it is. Even if it increased the welfare of all Chinese people viewed
together (or indeed of all people) to take their land away from these peasants, give them
very little compensation, such takings would not be justified unless one took properly
into account what the person affected by the taking wanted.
Consequentialists and utilitarians have argued that our choices are morally
constrained by negative responsibility. If, for instance, we are in fact able to share our
wealth with starving people we may bear moral responsibility for their starvation, if we
do not share.160 A difficulty with the application of this argument in the Chinese example
is that normally, those who are asked to share are the ones who are already poorer. Urban
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property developers and governments are not starving.161 Utilitarianism as a moral theory
is committed to measuring the happiness or welfare of people, without any principled
regard to the question of whose welfare or happiness it is. Rawls famously criticized
utilitarianism for its inability to take seriously the difference between persons.162

“Minor property rights.” In the circumstances of China’s rapidly urbanizing present,
peasants are wronged by being denied the right to sell land, not because this is an
immutable feature of ownership, or because there is some mystical natural right to
property, but because it violates their personal dignity to be deprived of control over their
lives and made instruments of the state’s “Scientific Development Perspective.” The right
to sell would importantly include the right not to sell, and this would be important in
essentially commercial contexts such as that of the transformation of Nongkou village
into a modern, high-end residential and commercial part of the city of Hangzhou. In
contexts such as these, the decision not to sell would allow the peasants to retain some
control over their lives in a changing environment. The decision to sell, on the other hand,
would allow them to participate in the real estate market. From the perspective of the
characteristically impersonal growth argument, it does not matter whether it is Ms L, or
anyone else, who makes a profit from the sale of the land she currently (still) occupies.
But of course whose profit it is, does matter in reality.
“Sales” of land directly by peasants or by villager communities outside the
framework set by state law have, in fact, occurred on a large scale in recent years. These
161
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practices are comprehensively known as “minor property rights” or “minor property right
housing.”163 Individual peasant households or whole peasant communities circumvent the
law by selling land directly to urban developers or urban residents seeking houses on the
city outskirts. This is viewed as illegal by the government, and as a consequence, the
price of such plots of land and/or houses built on it is much lower than the price of
property acquired in accordance with the rural expropriation process. Obviously, a grey
or black market in land cannot be run underground. According to some accounts, the
practice of “minor property rights” transactions began on the basis of local experiments
allowing the circulation of rural land use rights for urban construction in Guangdong
provinces and other places on the basis of local regulations, and then expanded
uncontrollably beyond the scope of these experiments.164 According to a July 2007 report
by Xinhua News Agency, 18 percent of the 400 residential developments then on sale in
the Beijing market were “minor property right” projects.165 Whatever its exact size was,
the market in minor property rights had developed, according to official media reports,
over a period of about ten years.166 People who bought “minor property right” properties
certainly appear to hope that, their acquisition of flats and land these flats were built on in
contravention of Land Administration Law will eventually be recognized by the law. Or
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perhaps, they merely hoped that they would not be thrown out. Crackdowns, so far as
they have occurred, have been half-hearted and inefficient,167 and an October 2008 Party
Central document168 announced that reforms might introduce mechanisms for nationwide
circulation of land use rights derived from collective rural owners, without answering the
difficult question how such a mechanism would be feasible.169
Some Chinese scholars have argued that “sales” of minor property rights ought to
be recognized by the state.170 Amongst these scholars is Hu Xingdou, who has argued
that minor property rights transactions are legal, because they do not violate the
Constitution – without apparently regarding as relevant the argument that mechanisms for
the recognition of property rights must be explicitly ‘created’ before they can produce an
effect erga omnes.171 Other scholars have explicitly referred to the fact that the Property
Rights Law characterizes alienability as a feature of ownership as the “most complete”
property right and argued that because peasant collectives own land, they also ought to
have a right to alienate.172
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It is important to be clear about the somewhat duplicitous nature of official
arguments pretending a commitment to collective ownership and the preservation of
collectively owned land, while at the same time taking property away in large scale
expropriations from peasant communities. It is important realize the basic unfairness of
barring hundreds of millions of citizens from participation in the national real estate
market, just because they are “peasants” locked in a collective ownership system that
allows them to live on the land, but not to exchange that land for money and a different
life somewhere else. Nor is the law on the books effectively enforced, to judge from the
apparent prevalence of “minor property rights” transactions. The more one looks for
authoritative meanings of “property” and “ownership” in Chinese law and legal decisions,
therefore, the less one can find anything there. On a non-authoritarian understanding of
property law, then, incoherence and wide disregard – including official disregard – for
the written, promulgated rules of the law, as well as the tension between these rules and
constitutional principles and commitments (such as equality before the law) cannot be
irrelevant to these rules’ effectiveness. They also matter to the supposed requirement that
property rights must be defined by the laws of the state. The less sense the laws in
existence make, the less important they seem to property law relations ‘created’ and
recognized in social life.
But even so it would be naïve to assume that the problem of “minor property
rights housing” could be solved simply by deciding to recognize property rights
“acquired” though the minor property right mechanism, or simply by allowing the
creation national market for circulation of rural land use rights. It would be hard, in a
rapidly urbanizing China, to limit the legal recognition of minor property rights only to
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rights acquired in the past. But if the circulation of rural land use rights on a national
market were allowed prospectively for future transactions, on the other hand, collective
rural ownership would only remain meaningful if collectives could retain some power of
decision about the transfer of such rights. Yet if that were the case, the state might remain
just as much in control of land transfers of rural land, as under the current law, and
nothing much would change in reality. If the collective owners of land retained no
influence over the decision to alienate (sell) rural land use rights, however, little point
would remain in retaining the derivative nature of the rural land use right as a use right
allotted to its members by rural collectives. And even if the collective nature of rural land
tenure were ultimately abandoned, as some speculate, it is impossible to tell if the state
would be willing to abandon its wide-reaching powers to expropriate rural landowners in
the interests of urban development.

Assertions of “full” ownership in peasant land rights declarations. As the social tensions
surrounding land are constantly rising, and as no judicial or legislative avenue to redress
past wrongs and prevent future ones has been found, some peasant communities have
taken the step of publicly declaring ownership rights in land that openly challenge the
definitions of the authorities.
In one of the most well-known cases, the peasants of Jiamusi in Heilongjiang
asserted land rights in a petition drive led by peasant rights leader Yang Chunlin in
December 2007. Their letter had declared that the ownership of their land “belongs to the
peasants belonging to the 72 administrative villages concerned and shall be distributed
equally to the peasants” on a village by village, household by household basis.
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Ownership, according to the declaration, comprises “the right to revenue from the land,
the right to inherit land, the right to alienate land, and the right to negotiate and ask for a
price in case the government and property developers want to develop the land.” Certain
plots currently occupied by property developers and the government are “taken back,”
according to the declaration, which says that a corrupt village official colluding with
government officials in the expropriation process has been recalled from office. The
Communist Revolution, the letter says, “promised that every farmer should have their
plot of farmland, every resident should have a home.” But this promise has been broken,
according to the authors: the land tenure system has become a pretext for local
government officials to act as de facto landowners, merely in the name of the state,
whereas the peasants, supposedly the landowners, have become serfs on the land
(nongnu),173 farming it as mere tenants of the landlords.
The letter concludes with a reference to the introduction of the chengbao land use
rights some twenty-five years ago, the reform which had brought a period of wealth
increase and relative prosperity in the countryside. “We trust that just as peasants then
struggled for the right to manage the land and brought about a great change at the
beginning of the Reform and Opening era, so we will now achieve an even greater
change by struggling for the peasants’ ownership rights in the land. We peasants have
suffered enough deprivation and betrayal. We have had enough of a life of crying to
heaven and hearth but not being heard. (…) Land is the life-line of the peasantry, it is the
peasants greatest human right. Only when we have obtained true ownership of the land
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can we live in peace and security, can the Chinese countryside live in peace and security,
can the entire country live in peace and security.”174
In a similar letter by the villagers of Shengzhuang in Jiangsu Province (mentioned
above), the authors, signing “in the name of” 250 peasant households, also cite some of
the revolutionary promises, but rely mainly on a different argument. They write,
“Shengzhuang, our village, lies on the border of three provinces, Jiangsu, Anhui and
Zhejiang. It is a national level travel resort famous for its ‘bamboo ocean’ and the village
reaches back 1500 years in history. Generation after generation of villagers lived together
harmoniously; they lived in harmony with the land they had been given by Heaven, and
they lived in harmony with the officials of the various ages. Throughout all the dynasties
and generations, the peasants had their own land to farm, it was clear to whom the
bamboo and the hills belonged, and the peasants respected each others’ land rights. Land
transactions were carried out in accordance with local custom, which the law of the
government protected.
“Since the revolution, the new terms of ‘villagers’ collective ownership’ and
‘chengbao land management’ have been introduced. But we peasants always thought: no
matter what we call it, the land is ours, the peasants’; it has served us for many
generations as land to build houses on, to farm, and to develop. Like the old governments,
the new government should take responsibility for protecting the land ownership rights of
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the peasants. It should protect the rights of the masses and help it develop. Only then can
it be called a government (…)” 175
As documents testifying to property rights conceptions openly divergent from the
state-centered one, these are important documents; and as such they are significant even
though, as Yu Jianrong observed, the peasants had been “helped” by a professional
lawyer. 176 But land rights declarations of this kind were predictably ineffective. The
Shengzhuang protest was quickly suppressed. 177 Yang Chunlin, the initiator of the
Heilongjiang letter, was detained, tortured in police detentionand later convicted of
inciting subversion. 178 After his conviction, more Heilongjiang peasant leaders were
sentenced to labor camp sentences. Reportedly, the peasant protests of Jiamusi have since
then died down, and Yang Chunlin is serving a five-year prison sentence. The peasants
had sought to take their challenge against the written law one step further than the many
rural communities who have chosen merely to ignore, but not publicly to reject the its
authority. Their experience indicates that this kind of public challenge is not a viable way
of bringing about change in the present political conditions.179
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VI. Conclusion

An impoverished conception of property solely by utilitarian reference to the “value” of
property in market terms can lead to facile acceptance of the argument that ongoing
takings of land from peasant communities are justified because they further some wider
national interest in growth. It encourages a dismissive interpretation of collective rural
ownership as “not really” amounting to ownership, because weakening rural citizens’
ownership by not allowing them to alienate land rights indirectly strengthens the state’s
ability to expropriate and thereby control the urbanization process. From the perspective
of these arguments, many peasant responses to takings are misunderstood as demands for
more compensation. Such requests can be dismissed by arguments focused on the
economic value of property; they are blind to the violations of dignity suffered in
expropriation contexts. From the perspective of the growth argument and from the
“Scientific Development Perspective,” peasant responses to property wrongs, such as the
sale of land in defiance of the official viewpoint or audacious calls for better protected
rights of ownership, can and should be dismissed.
The Chinese legal system has not so far been able to accommodate such claims as
contributions to an ongoing debate about the meaning of (land) ownership and property
rights. In contrast to some jurisdictions where debates over property are constitutional
debates,180 such claims have instead in some cases been treated as politically subversive.
If this debate could be taken into the courtrooms and into free and open discussion, it
might be possible to avoid further wrongs from accumulating amongst citizens deprived
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of land and homes, wrongs that keep adding to the great tensions within contemporary
Chinese society. But as the experience of Ms Land others illustrate, such a development
is currently unlikely. Ms Land others may invoke Pitt’s dictum, “the storm may enter, the
rain may enter, but the King cannot enter” in protests against expropriation, but such
claims have no chance of being heard. The 2007 Property Rights Law does not in its
current form support them, and arguments based in constitutional principle have no force
against the overwhelming rhetoric of “preserving growth”. When she managed, after
months, finally to present herself before an official of the Letters and Visits Office of the
Land and National Resources Ministry, the official barely looked at her petition materials
before saying that ‘we can definitely not do anything for you,’ according to Liang’s
account. Shooing her out of the office, she called Ms La diao fu181 - a disrespectful term
for a (female) ‘bad and unreasonable’ person.182
The conclusions to be drawn here, if correct, have implications beyond the Chinese
legal system, however. The promotion of secure property rights by World Bank
employees and research institutes continues to rely on the argument that a system of
secure and well protected private property rights promotes growth. The comment by De
Soto, cited earlier in this article, made this point very clearly by claiming that property
rights were important because they “give their owners sufficient incentive to add value to
their resources by investing, innovating, or pooling them productively for the prosperity
and progress of the entire community.” 183 On the basis of the present discussion this
argument is not empirically wrong; but it is morally unattractive, because of the

181

In Chinese, 刁妇。
Author conversation, July 2009. The stated inability of the Ministry to handle Liang’s case may have
been related to the fact of the vice-mayor Xu’s party detention.
183
De Soto, ibid., p. 178. et seq.
182

61

consistency of a growth-based justification of property rights with discrimination against
certain groups of property rights holders. In the Chinese example, the same
discrimination that gives rise to “minor” property rights practices similar to the
informales described by De Soto for Peru, is also the discrimination enabling the coercive,
relatively rapid and large-scale taking of land from Chinese peasants. There is no
evidence to doubt that property rights discrimination is economically “efficient” in
producing growth overall, and some evidence to think that in fact it is efficient. Of course,
this does not mean that economic efficiency has become undesirable. But considerations
of economic efficiency yield no argument against the discriminatory practices considered
in this article and such considerations therefore have to be given independent weight,
unless we want to accept it.
This conclusion is not reached by the World Bank, however, which in a recent joint
publication with the Chinese State Council said that the urban growth relying on takings
from Chinese peasants was “inefficient” because land prices were kept “artificially
low”.184 This assumes without any argument that market prices would be more “natural,”
invoking a liberal rhetoric to the effect that market mechanisms always lead to maximum
efficiency. But even if, as the authors of this text say to support their claim, much of the
land requisitioned (or expropriated) by government remains “idle” (neither built on nor
farmed), one cannot follow from this fact that the takings processes are economically
inefficient overall, measured by a GDP growth metric. It would be better to concede that
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aspects of a property regime may be unfair and unacceptable, even though they are
economically efficient.
Similarly, exploitative and discriminatory urban development practices may occur
in other legal systems, where private property rights are recognized with formal equality
(unlike in China), but where certain groups of property rights holders are repressed and
discriminated against for other reasons. Considerations concerning the economic
efficiency of property rights are unable to constrain their exercise to prevent such
injustices. Different normative considerations, such as political obligations on the part of
the state to protect housing rights and to protect human dignity, therefore constrain any
acceptable interpretation of property rights, as Alexander has shown with comparative
reference to South Africa and other countries:
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property rights are inherently

constrained by a “social obligation norm”; they are not absolute but relative to other
rights and obligations.
In sum, the simplistic understanding of property as wealth favors justifications of
property rights too much focused on value maximization and economic growth. The fact
that these growth and wealth oriented conceptions of property are insensitive to the
distribution of property across a society means also that they are insensitive to the wrongs
that can be caused to a person by changing that distribution, or in other ways. These
problems do not affect every neo-liberal conception of property rights, 186 but they do
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show a serious flaw in the most influential one, that views the protection of property
rights as a vehicle for economic growth.
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